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In the United States, both federal and state governments have tried to establish and enforce 
child labor laws to protect youth from work that interferes with their schooling. While federal 
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two most common state child labor restrictions are work permit requirements for teenagers 
and school dropout ages that are more stringent than federal requirements.  If these laws are 
effectively targeted and enforced, children living in states legislating more stringent child 
labor laws should be less likely to work, should work fewer hours if they do work, and they 
should have better average schooling outcomes.  The results show that stricter state laws do 
not lower significantly the likelihood that a 14-15 year old youths work or the likelihood 
their hours exceed  federal guidelines.  Child labor laws do have small positive effects on 
academic outcomes.  State work permit requirements modestly increase the likelihood of 
college entry while more stringent truancy laws increase marginally high school academic 
performance.  
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I.  Introduction  
 Nearly one-fifth of 14 year-olds, the youngest legal working age, works at least one 
week at any point during a school year.  The likelihood of working rises steadily with age: 
29% of 15-year-olds; 60% of 16-year-olds; 71% of 17-year-olds.1 These high youth 
employment rates raise concerns about the desirability of working while attending high 
school.  
Parents believe that child labor can foster self-reliance and money management skills, 
smooth the transition from school to work, and allow the child to save money for college. 
However, employment during high school could lead to less time being spent on academic or 
extracurricular activities that presumably improve learning while in school. Under current 
competing views, some policy makers advocated programs to improve school - work 
connections for youth2 while others have advocated restriction on child labor.3 
In the United States, both federal and state governments have tried to establish and 
enforce child labor laws to protect youth from work that may be dangerous and that may 
interfere with their schooling. Since 1938, the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) has 
regulated child labor at the Federal level.  It limits the number of hours and the type of work 
for 14- and 15-year olds. In addition, many state laws mandate standards that go beyond the 
Federal law.  The most common of these set maximum hours and/or night work restrictions 
for 16- and 17-year olds or set more stringent restrictions on school-leaving age.  
                                                 
1  Similar patterns are shown in Rothstein (2001) and in USDL 03-40, a news release from the U.S. Bureau of 
Labor Statistics (2003). There are two job types related to early work experience. “Employee” jobs involve an 
ongoing relationship with a particular employer such as working in a grocery market. “Freelance” jobs  have no 
specific boss such as informal babysitting.  We only have information on employee jobs.  
2 For example, the 1994 School-to-Work Opportunities Act includes incentives for states to strengthen the 
linkage between school and work. 
3 For example, in 1998, a National Research Council panel recommended that limitations be placed on the 
number of hours of work for 16- and 17-years olds while in school. 
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There is mixed evidence on the impact of these laws.  Lleras-Muney (2002) examined 
how state compulsory attendance and child labor laws contributed to the increase in 
educational attainment of U.S. residents in the first half of the twentieth century. Laws 
requiring children to attend 1 more year of school or increasing the minimum working age by 
one year increased average years of schooling by 5 percent from 1915 to 1939. In contrast, 
Moehling (1999) found that child labor regulations had little apparent effect on child labor 
between 1880 and 1910.   
The differences in their findings emphasize that these laws may only make a 
difference if they are enforced. Moskowitz (2000) argues that weak enforcement and 
penalties mean that federal laws do not adequately protect children against occupational 
hazards.  Kruse and Mahony (2000) provide comprehensive estimates of the extent of illegal 
child labor in the United States using Current Population Survey (CPS) and other sources.4 
They estimate that 154,000 children under 18 or roughly 0.7% of the population of children 
were engaged in working in violation of state or federal child laws in an average week.5 
Because teenagers move in and out of the labor force frequently, the fraction of teens 
working illegally during a year is much larger. 
The Moskowitz and Kruse and Mahoney studies leave unanswered whether there are 
adverse consequences for children engaged in illegal child labor.  This study extends their 
work by examining how state child labor laws affect child work time allocation and school 
outcomes.  Because states vary in the strictness of state labor and truancy regulations, we can 
                                                 
4 They combined 33 monthly CPS surveys from January 1995 to September 1997 in order to estimate illegal 
employment of teens aged 15 and older. Their information on 14-years old and younger workers was taken from 
the NLSY79, the NLSY97 and the NLS-Adolescent Health data. 
5 They determined illegal working by matching occupation codes of youth into the federal or state restrictions 
on type of work. Also, hours restriction of FLSA is applied to estimate of illegal working of 14-and 15-year-
olds. 
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determine if stricter laws are effective in limiting teen work and whether they improve 
schooling outcomes. 
This study examines how state child labor legislation affects the employment and 
school decisions of youth aged 14 through 17.  Our findings suggest that stricter state child 
labor laws do not lower the likelihood that a child works, nor do they lower the likelihood of 
working in excess of federal hours limits.  Furthermore, children who work excessive hours 
relative to the legal limits do not suffer inferior schooling outcomes.  Stricter state laws 
requiring work permits or raising the truancy age do have small positive effects on schooling 
outcomes.   
The next section summarizes the existing federal and state child labor laws. Section 
III specifies an empirical strategy for measuring how state laws affect labor supply and 
schooling choices. Section IV presents the data and section V reviews our results. In section 
VI, we discuss the implications of this study for policy and further research. 
II. Child Labor Laws 
 States can have stricter child labor laws than the federal law, but the federal child 
labor laws hold in the absence of stricter state laws.  In the United States, FLSA gives the 
Department of Labor authority to prohibit minors under age 18 from working in occupations 
deemed too hazardous. The FLSA also limits the number of hours and times of day that 14- 
and 15-year olds can work. At those ages, children are limited to work a maximum of three 
hours per day and eight hours per week during weeks that school is in session, and no more 
than forty hours per week during school vacations. Children under the age of 14 are 
prohibited from working except for agricultural employment, working for a family business, 
or performing “freelance work” such as babysitting or delivering newspapers. Child labor in 
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agriculture is much less regulated.  Regardless of age, children may be employed in any non-
hazardous farm job without any restriction on number of hours during the school year. 
Children younger than age 14 may work only on their parents’ farm or on another farm with 
the written consent of their parents. Children who are 14 or older may work on farms without 
parental consent. By age 16, youths are no longer subject to protective restrictions on 
agricultural jobs which are regarded as hazardous. 
While the FLSA concentrates on the labor of youth under 16 years of age, some states 
have extended restrictions to older youth. Sixteen states have child labor laws restricting the 
working hours of 16 and 17 year-old youth through a work permit requirement.  An 
additional 22 states require work permits for 14 and 15 year olds that are more restrictive 
than the federal requirements.  State compulsory school attendance laws limit work indirectly 
by requiring time in school.  Twenty two states have truancy ages above 16, the federal 
truancy age.6   
 The stated goal of the FLSA and state child labor law is to protect youth from long 
work hours or dangerous working conditions. Presumably, the hours restrictions are intended 
to guide youth on levels of work intensity that will not retard educational development but 
will allow work experience that may ease entry into the full-time labor market after leaving 
high school.  If these laws are effective, they should have a positive impact on the probability 
of completing high school or attending college and should improve academic performance in 
high school.  The next section proposes an empirical strategy for assessing whether those 
expectations are consistent with the data on child academic progress across states. 
III. Model Specification 
                                                 
6 Compulsory attendance laws by state is available on NCSE(2003). 
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 We assume that parents decide or at least approve their child’s intensity of 
employment. Let ijW {0, 1, 2, 3}be an ordered indicator variable representing progressively 
higher values of hours of work for a child i in state j.   It is convenient to relate the observed 
data to our policy application, and so we set the thresholds to correspond to the legal federal 
limits on child working hours.  For a child who does not work at all during school year, 
0=ijW . For a child who works within FLSA hours guidelines, 1=ijW .  2=ijW indicates a 
modest degree of FLSA violations, taken to be one to five weekly violations during the 
school year.  3=ijW  indicates frequent violations, defined as more than five weekly 
violations in the school year. The threshold of five weekly violations which distinguishes 
between ‘modest’  and ‘frequent’ violators was selected to divide the violators into two 
groups of roughly equal size.  
 There are two issues that require comment regarding our use of these ordered work 
states.  First, we use federal hours limits as the reference for ijW  despite the fact that we are 
evaluating state child labor laws.  Had we used the state limits as the reference, states with 
more restrictive laws would have violations that would not be counted as a violation in more 
lax states.  The federal guidelines provide a common reference across all states.  Second, we 
could have used child work hours directly rather than these four groupings.  Our use of the 
groups helps to highlight the threshold nature of working within versus working outside the 
FLSA guidelines.  In addition, the groupings may help to sidestep some measurement 
problems associated with recollections of working hours during the year.  We expect that 
youth may be able to recall occasional from frequent weekly hours violations, but not 
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necessarily the actual number of occurrences of those violations.  Therefore the ordered 
groupings may be better measures of the incidence of illegal work.  
 Letting *ijW
 be a latent variable indexing progressively greater work intensity, we 
assume  
 ijWijWijij DZW εγβ ++=* ,           (1) 
where ijD  is a dummy variable indicating whether the state has more restrictive child labor 
laws than the federal level; ijZ  is a vector of individual and household demographic and 
socioeconomic characteristics; and ijε  is a random error for child i in state j.  As *ijW  
increases, the probability a child is found in a particular  work intensity state is given by   
 0=ijW    if 0* ≤ijW    
1=ijW     if 1*0 μ≤< ijW                             (2)   
2=ijW   if 2*1 μμ ≤< ijW  
 3=ijW    if *2 ijW<μ   
If the errors are distributed standard normal, equations (1) and (2) describe an ordered probit 
specification.  The regression parameters ,W Wβ γ and the two cut points can be estimated 
using maximum likelihood methods. 
 In typical cases, if restrictive state child labor laws are effective in regulating work 
intensity, then 0.Wγ <   In our ordered specification, it is possible that the laws may shift 
children into legal work from illegal work, but also from not working to working.  In that 
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case, the opposite sign might obtain.   To avoid incorrect inferences, we will need to evaluate 
the probability of each outcome ijW  as the laws change.
7 
 We are also interested in determining how child labor laws affect school outcomes.  
We will employ regressions of the form 
ijS  = 0δ  + EDijZ β + Dij SD γ  + ijν ,                                                     (3)  
where ijS  is a schooling outcome measure; ijν  is the error term; and the other variables are as 
defined above. If restrictions on child labor are useful, they should positively affect 
measurable academic outcomes so that DSγ >0.  
 If the restrictions on child labor are set appropriately, we should find stronger effects 
of illegal than legal labor and there should be no adverse impact of legal labor on school 
outcomes.  To investigate these hypotheses, we can insert measures of hours worked within 
and beyond the federal guidelines as measures of the degree of violation of child labor limits. 
These hypotheses can be tested directly by replacing ijD by ijW  in (3) so that 
ijS  = 0δ  + EWijZ β  + Wij SW γ  + ijυ ,                                                     (4)  
Youth working beyond federal guidelines should suffer adverse schooling outcomes so that 
0WSγ < .   
Are state child labor laws exogenous? 
                                                 
7 Using the standard normal distribution for ijε  and using βX  as shorthand notation for ( WijWij DZ γβ + ),  
Pr( 0=ijW )  = Pr )0( * ≤ijW = )0( ≤+ ijX εβ  =Φ ( βX ), Pr( 1=ijW )= Pr(0< *ijW  ≤ 1μ ) = (0< ≤+ )( ijX εβ 1μ ) 
= )( 1 βμ X−Φ - )( βX−Φ ,… ,and Pr( )2* μ≥ijW = ( )2μεβ ≥+ ijX = 1- )( 2 βμ X−Φ  where Φ  is the standard 
normal cumulative distribution function.  Each of these probabilities can be evaluated at ijD =1 and ijD =0, 
holding all other exogenous variables constant (See Greene(1997), Cameron & Trivedi(2005) and 
Wooldridge(2002)). 
 8
The specifications above presume that state child labor and truancy laws are 
exogenous.  This would not be true if households move across state boundaries because of 
the child labor or truancy laws, or if those laws are altered in response to prevailing and 
pervasive tastes for child labor or schooling outcomes in the state.  It seems unlikely that 
parents migrate across states because of state laws restricting child labor, but it is more 
plausible that child labor laws are set in response to preexisting attitudes toward child labor 
in the state.  We explore the issue using probit regressions of dichotomous variables 
indicating the existence of various restrictive state child labor laws.  States are defined as 
having more stringent child labor laws if they require a work permit for 16- or 17-year olds 
or if they specified a legal dropout age above age 16.  Regressors include state per capita 
income, state unionization rates and a dummy variable indicating whether the state has a 
higher minimum wage than the federal minimum wage rate.  We would expect that if 
protective child labor laws are endogenous, they would be positively correlated with these 
measures of support for pro-labor policies or state income levels.  
Note that this specification does not presume a causal relationship between the 
regressors and the dependent variable—it is merely a convenient mechanism to assess 
underlying correlations in the data.  For example, a high correlation between state minimum 
wage and child labor legislation would suggest a greater likelihood that an underlying taste 
for protective labor legislation exists in the state. 
Results are reported in Table 1.  The first column reports the probit estimates 
explaining the existence of state work permit requirements and the second column reports the 
estimates explaining the existence of state compulsory schooling attendance laws.  The 
estimates show that states with child labor legislation that exceed the federal minimums are 
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not disproportionately wealthy, unionized, or prone to passing other protective legislation.8 
While this is not a definitive test, it does not appear that state child labor laws are highly 
correlated with other state restrictive legislation or preexisting tastes that would bias our 
coefficient estimates. 
IV.  Data 
      A. NLSY97 
 The National Longitudinal Survey of Youth 1997 (NLSY97) provides data on the 
transition from school to work for a representative sample of U.S. youths born in 1980 
through 1984. The NLSY97 sample covers 43 states and provides a wealth of useful 
information on household factors that may be correlated with labor market behavior and 
educational experiences. It also tracks the working hours of youths on a weekly basis from 
age 14 onward. The tracking data also include information on whether and when respondents 
obtained a high school diploma, how well they performed in school, and whether they went 
to college.  By May 31, 2002, roughly two-thirds of the NLSY97 sample was old enough to 
have graduated from high school, and roughly 77% of those had actually graduated.  
 We are interested in assessing how measures of child labor intensity and school 
performance are related to state child labor and truancy laws, holding constant ijZ  that should 
affect schooling and employment decisions.  The vector ijZ  includes measures of child 
ability, gender and race, and the socioeconomic and demographic attributes of the parents.  
Child ability is measured by 8th grade GPA. Poor academic preparation for high school may 
lower the returns to schooling and increase the likelihood of working at a young age. 
                                                 
8 The results are similar when ordered measures reflecting increasing rigor of child labor laws are used in place 
of the dichotomous dependent variables.  For example, we also find no significant predictors of the existence of 
work permit requirements measured with higher values for requirements at ages 16, 17 and 18. 
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Previous studies have shown that a child’s performance in school is strongly influenced by 
the child’s parents.  We control for the presence of two biological parents in the household 
and households with at least one missing parent.  We also control for the education of the 
father and mother and for aggregate household income, all of which would be expected to 
raise household demand for schooling. The impact of these variables on child labor is less 
certain in the literature.  Finally, we include a dummy variable for rural residence, as there 
may be more demand for child labor in rural areas, particularly with regard to agricultural 
work.  
     B. Descriptive analysis 
 
         B.1. Employment experience of high school-aged youth 
 
Table 2 reports the employment rate and average working hours during the school 
year for youth who eventually completed high school.  Averages are further broken down by 
demographic and community characteristics.  Academic year labor supply rises with age.  
Nineteen percent of children work in their 14th year at an average of 6.4 hours per week.  
Labor force participation dramatically increases to 61% by age 16, with average weekly 
hours worked rising to 11.6.  There is a significant difference between boys’ and girls’ labor-
force participation rates and cumulative working hours. At earlier ages, boys are more likely 
to work, but the gap disappears by age 17.  At all ages, however, boys work more hours.  
White children have higher labor force participation rates and work more hours than either 
Black or Hispanic youth.  Those with the highest 8th grade GPAs are the most likely to work, 
but they work fewer hours per week.   
Child labor force participation differs significantly by parental attributes.  Children 
with two-biological parents in the household are more likely to work. Children worked least 
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if their parents did not complete high school. They worked most if their parents had some 
college training. However, children with more educated parents tend to work more modest 
hours.  Students in households with lower income might be expected to work more in order 
to pay for additional schooling or to finance current consumption. However, youth in the 
lowest income households are the least likely to work.  Youth in wealthier households 
participate most in the labor market, but they work fewer hours than average.  Rural youth 
are modestly more likely to work than their urban counterparts.  The rural-urban gap in 
average cumulative hours shrinks with age. 
         B.2 Illegal youth employment 
To assess the effectiveness of child labor regulations, we need to know how many 
youth are working illegally.  We define a work week as illegal if a child worked an excessive 
number of hours using the FLSA standards as a gauge. The most common violation is 
working beyond the legal maximum.  By federal standards, 14-and 15-year-olds are regarded 
as working illegally if they worked over 40 hours per week during the summer or more than 
18 hours per week when school is in session. Following the classification used in the model, 
Table 3 shows the distribution of employment states for  youth aged 14 and 15 between 1994 
and 1999. Work states 3,2=ijW  indicate working in violation of FLSA maximum hours limits. 
For high school graduates, 3% of 14-year-olds worked illegally between 1 and 5 weeks 
during the school year or 17% of working 14-year olds.  A similar proportion violated the 
law more than 5 weeks of the school year. By age 15, the proportion of regularly violating 
the hours’ restrictions during the school year rises to 9% or nearly one-third of working 15-
year-olds. Dropouts violated FLSA guidelines at the almost same rate.  However, conditional 
on working, dropouts were more likely to work in violation of FLSA hours limits. Violations 
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were less common in summer months than during the school year, reflecting the much higher 
hours limits during school vacations.9  
Table 4 presents additional information on the incidence of legal and illegal work for 
14-15 year old children by whether they ultimately dropped out of or graduated from high 
school.  Labor supply measures are for any week during the two-year period, and so a higher 
fraction is observed working than in Table 3 which presents statistics for a single year.  
Children who eventually dropped out of school were significantly less likely to work 
than those who eventually graduated from high school. However, graduates worked more 
commonly within federal hours guidelines.  White and Hispanic dropouts are more likely to 
violate FLSA hours limits, but for the most part, the demographic distribution of illegal 
workers is similar between dropouts and graduates.   
V. Empirical Results 
      A. Are state child labor laws effective in limiting child labor? 
In Table 5, we examine whether variation in the rigor of the state child labor laws 
affects federal labor law violations for youth aged 14 and 15.  The first three columns show 
that neither state work permit requirements nor state truancy laws significantly affect the 
intensity of work for 14-year-olds.  The same conclusions hold for 15-year-olds.  It does not 
appear that state child labor regulations affect whether a child works, how much a child 
works, or whether the child works in violation of federal guidelines.  Of the other factors, 
                                                 
9  The percent of youth who violated FLSA standards in this study is greater than reported by Kruse and 
Mahony (2000) based on the Current Population Survey (CPS). This is to be expected because the NLSY97 
reports employment over 52 weeks rather than only in the last week as in the CPS.  Also, the CPS relies on a 
primary respondent other than the youth him or herself to collect data on youth employment.  The NLSY97 
survey is always answered by the youth. Parents may not always be aware of the children’s working hours, 
especially if the employment is sporadic or occasionally involves excessive hours.  
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youth are more likely to work in violation of federal guidelines if they are white, male, rural, 
and from wealthier households. 
 To obtain a clearer idea of the impact of state child labor laws on probability of each 
work intensity state, we evaluate the probabilities of each outcome at sample means.10   We 
estimate the probabilities alternating WD  (or SD ) = 1 and WD  (or SD ) = 0, all other variables 
held at their sample averages.  For example, when WD  =0, the predicted probabilities of the 
four labor supply states are Pr ( 0=ijW ) = 0.82, Pr ( 1=ijW ) = 0.12, Pr ( 2=ijW ) = 0.03 and Pr 
( 3=ijW ) = 0.03.   The corresponding probabilities when WD  =1 are 0.82, 0.12, 0.03 and 
0.03 . We can perform statistical tests on the differences between these predicted 
probabilities, as summarized in Table 6.  More stringent work permit requirements reduce the 
incidence of legal and illegal work by less than one percentage point.  The same lack of 
substantial change in labor supply choices can be seen contrasting the presence and the 
absence of state compulsory attendance laws.  Controlling for other demographic factors, the 
predicted probability of working in violation of the FLSA is decreased by less than 1% when 
a state imposes more stringent compulsory attendance laws.  
It is possible that the combination of constraints on child labor may matter, even 
when no individual policy appears to affect choices.  However, even when both policies are 
in effect compared to neither policy being enacted, the combined policies lower the 
likelihood of working by only 2 percentage points and decrease the likelihood of frequent 
federal hours violations by less than one percentage point.  Nearly identical results are found 
for 15 year olds.  On the whole, state work permit requirements and compulsory school 
attendance laws change child labor patterns only marginally.  It is difficult to believe that 
                                                 
10 Our derivations are based on Greene (1997). 
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these modest effects alter the time available for schooling by an economically important 
amount.   
      B. Are state child labor laws effective in raising schooling attainment? 
   Child labor laws may affect schooling outcomes, even if they have negligible effects 
on child labor supply. Table 7 reports estimates of equation (3).  Our measures of schooling 
outcomes include high school grade point average and completion and the choice to attend 
college. Requiring a work permit under age 18 does not seem to affect the probability of 
completing high school, nor does it affect high school GPA.  It does raise the probability of 
attending college by 3 percentage points, but the estimate is only marginally significant.  
Compulsory attendance laws that require youth to stay in school through ages 17 or 18 have a 
small impact on achievement, raising high school GPA by 0.06 or 2%.  More stringent 
attendance laws have no discernable effect on the probability of attending college.  When we 
combine the effects of the two state laws, the only significant effect is a small improvement 
in high school GPA.  
 The control variables ijZ  have plausible effects on schooling outcomes.  Students are 
more likely to complete high school, attend college, and get good grades if they are female, 
have a high 8th grade GPA, high household income, well-educated parents, and both parents 
present in the home.  
      C. Are federal hours guidelines effective in raising schooling attainment? 
It appears that state laws are only marginally effective in raising schooling outcomes. 
This begs the question of whether hours guidelines are set effectively so as to ensure that 
schooling does not suffer.  To examine this question, we estimate equation (4) to assess 
whether there are negative schooling consequences from working in excess of proscribed 
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hours limits.  Dummy variables indicate three employment status measures, ( ijW = 1, 2, 3) 
with non-workers ( ijW = 0) as the reference group. The results are given in Table 8.  
Compared to children not working, we find that children working within FLSA limits 
have a greater likelihood of completing high school.  However, those frequently working in 
violation of FLSA are no less likely to complete high school than are children who never 
work during the school year.  There is no discernible effect of child labor patterns on high 
school GPA or the probability of going to college.  Overall, there is no strong consistent 
evidence that children working hours in excess of the federal legal limits have inferior 
schooling outcomes relative to children who do not work at all.  This suggests that the federal 
guidelines are not well targeted to limit types of child labor that hinder academic outcomes.  
VI. Conclusions  
If restrictions on child labor are useful, they should be tied to measurable employment 
status or academic outcomes.  Our study shows that more stringent state child labor laws 
requiring work permit requirement under age 18 and mandating that children stay in school 
through ages 17 or 18 have almost no impact on labor market entry decisions or the 
frequency of working hours in violation of federal labor law. In addition, youth whose work 
hours exceed federal guidelines do not have inferior schooling outcomes to teens who do not 
work at all.  These findings suggest that state labor laws do not have strong effects on youth 
labor supply choices and that hours restrictions are not well supported by evidence on 
adverse impacts of work hours on schooling. 
State truancy and work permit regulations do have small positive effects on high 
school academic performance, the likelihood of completing high school, and the likelihood of 
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entering college.  However, in all cases the effects are smaller than 3% and are frequently 
imprecisely estimated.  Past studies have shown that these laws have had more substantial 
effects on schooling decisions historically.  
Variations in state employment and truancy laws have played a prominent role in 
studies of returns to schooling.  Historically, changes in federal and state labor laws have 
been found to have important effects on youth schooling and labor supply decisions.  
Consequently, these laws have proven useful as exogenous factors shifting years of schooling 
to correct for endogeneity in years of schooling completed.11 Our findings suggest that these 
laws are much weaker instruments for current educational and labor supply decisions than 
they may have been historically. 
                                                 
11 Angrist and Krueger (1991), Tyler (2003) and Rothstein (2007) are examples of papers that used state 
variation in child labor laws to help identify time allocated to school or work. 
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Table 1. Probit estimates of the effect of state characteristics on the rigor of state child labor laws  
 State child labor laws 
State characteristics Work permit requirement 
under age 18 )1( =wD  
Compulsory schooling attendance 
above age 16 )1( =sD  
Log (state per capita income) 2.315 
(1.726) 
-2.229 
(1.572) 
State union density .029 
(.037) 
.002 
(.036) 
State minimum wage above FLSA standard -.108 
(.535) 
.622 
(.510) 
Constant -24.369 
(17.231) 
22.163 
(15.652) 
Log-likelihood -28.317 -33.105 
N 51 51 
Pseudo R2 .083 .042 
Note. Standard errors are in parenthesis. 
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 Table 2. Percent of high school graduates employed during the school year and average weekly hours worked if employed 
by age and demographic characteristics, 1994-2001 (N=3384) 
Characteristics Age14 Age15 Age16 Age17 Age14-17 
Total 18.9 
(6.4) 
29.3 
(8.2) 
60.5 
(11.6) 
73.3 
(16.0) 
81.7 
(6.8) 
Gender      
  Female 14.3 
(5.7) 
26.3 
(7.4) 
59.3 
(11.3) 
73.5 
(15.8) 
80.6 
(5.9) 
  Male 24.1 
(7.0) 
32.6 
(8.9) 
61.8 
(11.9) 
73.0 
(16.3) 
82.9 
(7.2) 
Race or Ethnicity      
  Black 11.1 
(5.5) 
19.6 
(7.6) 
50.6 
(12.2) 
64.7 
(15.3) 
73.8 
(6.2) 
  Hispanic 14.7 
(5.0) 
20.2 
(7.3) 
48.7 
(11.2) 
64.8 
(15.4) 
73.1 
(6.0) 
  White 23.4 
(6.9) 
36.0 
(8.4) 
68.2 
(11.6) 
79.4 
(16.4) 
87.5 
(7.3) 
8th Grade GPA      
  Less than 2.50 18.3 
(5.9) 
27.8 
(7.6) 
59.5 
(11.8) 
72.3 
(16.1) 
81.4 
(6.7) 
  2.51 – 3.50 18.2 
(6.5) 
29.0 
(8.2) 
60.2 
(11.9) 
73.9 
(16.6) 
81.6 
(7.0) 
  3.51 – 4.00 20.9 
(6.9) 
31.4 
(8.7) 
62.2 
(10.7) 
73.3 
(15.0) 
82.1 
(6.7) 
Family Structure      
  Two-biological  parents 21.5 
(6.3) 
30.9 
(8.2) 
61.7 
(11.3) 
73.7 
(15.6) 
82.5 
(6.8) 
  Not Two-biological  parents 14.9 
(6.7) 
26.8 
(8.2) 
58.6 
(12.1) 
72.7 
(16.7) 
80.5 
(6.9) 
Note. The top number is the percent working at least one week.  The number in parentheses is the average hours worked per week, computed by dividing 
cumulative hours of work during the school year by the number of weeks in the school term.
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Table 2. (Continued) 
Characteristics Age14 Age15 Age16 Age17 Age14-17 
Father’s education      
  HS dropout 16.5 
(5.7) 
22.0 
(8.3) 
52.5 
(13.3) 
69.5 
(16.2) 
75.8 
(6.9) 
  HS graduate 21.5 
(7.4) 
31.5 
(8.6) 
63.9 
(12.2) 
76.6 
(17.3) 
84.1 
(7.5) 
  Some College 22.1 
(6.9) 
34.0 
(8.8) 
67.3 
(11.9) 
78.3 
(16.9) 
86.8 
(7.4) 
  College and higher 20.8 
(5.5) 
32.0 
(7.0) 
63.0 
(9.7) 
73.5 
(13.9) 
82.9 
(5.9) 
Mother’s education      
  HS dropout 13.1 
(6.8) 
20.4 
(8.6) 
48.3 
(12.0) 
63.0 
(16.0) 
71.7 
(6.5) 
  HS graduate 20.6 
(6.8) 
31.3 
(8.8) 
63.0 
(12.4) 
76.7 
(17.4) 
83.7 
(7.6) 
  Some College 18.9 
(5.9) 
32.0 
(8.4) 
64.5 
(11.5) 
79.7 
(15.7) 
86.2 
(6.9) 
  College and higher 20.8 
(5.8) 
29.5 
(6.8) 
60.7 
(10.1) 
70.7 
(13.8) 
81.5 
(5.9) 
Household Income      
  Less than $ 25,000 14.5 
(5.8) 
22.2 
(8.1) 
51.1 
(11.2) 
64.7 
(15.1) 
73.4 
(6.2) 
  $25,000 -  $44,999 18.9 
(7.2) 
28.2 
(8.2) 
58.0 
(12.2) 
73.0 
(17.0) 
81.9 
(7.1) 
  $45,000 -  $74,999 19.2 
(6.7) 
31.0 
(8.6) 
66.1 
(11.9) 
76.7 
(16.8) 
84.1 
(7.4) 
  $75,000 or more 22.5 
(6.0) 
34.7 
(7.8) 
65.2 
(11.1) 
77.2 
(15.1) 
86.0 
(6.7) 
Residence Area      
  Rural  22.4 
(7.6) 
31.4 
(9.2) 
61.1 
(12.2) 
73.8 
(16.3) 
81.9 
(7.3) 
  Urban 17.4 
(5.9) 
28.4 
(7.7) 
60.2 
(11.4) 
73.1 
(15.9) 
81.6 
(6.6) 
Note. The top number is the percent working at least one week.  The number in parentheses is the average hours worked per week, computed by dividing 
cumulative hours of work during the school year by the number of weeks in the school term. 
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Table 3. Employment status of youth aged 14 or 15, 1994-1999 by eventual high school completion  
 
0=ijW : 
Not Working  
1=ijW : 
Working within FLSA 
hours limits 
2=ijW :  
Occasionally violating 
FLSA hours limits  
3=ijW :  
Frequently violating 
FLSA hours limits 
(All children) Dropouts HS graduates Dropouts HS graduates Dropouts HS graduates Dropouts HS graduates 
School months         
At age 14 85.3 81.1 7.6 12.5 4.1 3.3 3.3 3.2 
At age 15 76.4 70.7 9.2 15.8 4.8 4.8 9.7 8.7 
Summer months         
At age 14 84.1 80.4 14.3 18.6 1.0 0.4 0.7 0.6 
At age 15 77.7 68.8 20.6 29.1 0.2 0.8 1.6. 1.4 
(Working children) Dropouts HS graduates Dropouts HS graduates Dropouts HS graduates Dropouts HS graduates
School months         
At age 14 NA NA 50.6 66.0 27.5 17.2 22.0 16.7 
At age 15 NA NA 38.9 54.0 20.1 16.4 41.0 29.6 
Summer months         
At age 14 NA NA 89.7 95.0 6.2 2.0 4.1 3.0 
At age 15 NA NA 91.9 93.1 0.7 2.6 7.4 4.4 
Note: There are 608 dropouts and 3384 high school graduates in the sample
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Table 4. Cumulative employment status during the school year of youth during ages 14-15 by high school completion and 
demographic characteristics, 1994-1999  
 0=ijW : 
 
Not working 
1=ijW : 
Working within FLSA  
hours limits 
3or  2=ijW : 
Violating FLSA 
hours limits 
 Dropouts HS Graduates dif Dropouts HS Graduates dif  Dropouts HS Graduates dif. 
Total 71.6 66.6 * 11.3 17.7 ** 17.1 15.7  
Gender          
  Female 74.9 70.5 ** 9.2 15.7 *** 15.9 13.8  
  Male 69.0 62.2  13.0 19.9  *** 18.0 17.9  
Race or Ethnicity          
  Black 80.7 76.2  9.9  9.7    9.4  14.2 * 
  Hispanic 78.8 74.5  6.4 12.8 *** 14.8 12.8 *** 
  White 60.9 59.6 ** 15.8 22.9  23.3 17.4 ** 
8th Grade GPA          
  Less than 2.50 74.8 68.0 *** 11.4 17.3 *** 13.8 14.7  
  2.51 – 3.50 60.8 66.8 * 12.4 16.7  26.9 16.5 *** 
  3.51 – 4.00 90.5 64.4 ** 4.8  19.9 * 4.8  15.7  
Family Structure          
  Two-biological  parents 66.4 65.1  14.3 19.8 ** 19.3 15.1 * 
  Not two-biological  parents 74.3 69.1 ** 9.8  14.4 *** 15.9 16.6  
Father’s Education          
  HS dropout 72.7 72.8  11.5 12.3  15.8 15.0  
  HS graduate 68.4 63.2  12.0 18.6 * 19.7 18.2  
  Some College 57.9 61.3  15.8 22.4  26.3 16.4 * 
  College and higher 60.0 64.5  15.0 22.3  25.0 13.2  
Mother’s Education          
  HS dropout 76.6 76.4  6.3 10.2 * 17.1 13.5  
  HS graduate 69.8 63.0 ** 13.2 18.2 * 17.0 18.8  
  Some College 67.0 64.5  19.4 20.4  13.6 15.1  
  College and higher 61.1 65.7  16.7 20.3  22.2 14.1  
Note. There are 608 dropouts and 3384 high school graduates in the sample .  dif represents the test of difference in means between high school dropout and 
high school graduate samples.  *** Significant at 1% level,  ** Significant at 5% level, * Significant at 10% level. 
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Table 4. (continued) 
 0=ijW : 
 
Not working 
1=ijW : 
Working within FLSA  
hours limits 
3or  2=ijW : 
Violating FLSA 
hours limits 
 Dropouts HS Graduates dif Dropouts HS Graduates dif  Dropouts HS Graduates dif 
Household Income          
 Less than $ 25,000 77.7 74.0  9.5  12.6  12.7 13.4  
$25,000 -  $44,999 63.6 67.6  11.4 14.8  25.0 17.5 ** 
$45,000 -  $74,999 64.7 64.9  17.2 19.3  18.1 15.8  
$ 75,000 or more 61.4 60.6  13.6 23.7  25.0 15.9  
Residence Area          
Rural  71.3 63.7 * 13.5 17.7  15.2 18.6  
Urban 71.6 67.8 * 10.7 17.6 * 17.6 14.6 * 
Note. There are 608 dropouts and 3384 high school graduates in the sample.  dif represents the test of difference in means between high school dropout and 
high school graduate samples.  *** Significant at 1% level,  ** Significant at 5% level, * Significant at 10% level. 
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Table 5. Ordered Probit estimation of employment status at ages 14 and 15 on state child labor laws and control variables 
Variable Employment status at age 14 Employment status at age 15 
Work Permit Requirement 
Under age 18 )1( =WD  
-.023 
(.049) 
 
 
-.028 
(.049) 
-.019 
(.044) 
 -.022 
(.044) 
Compulsory schooling attendance 
above age 16 )1( =SD  
 -.084 
(.051) 
-.085 
(.051) 
 -.034 
(.045) 
-.036 
(.045) 
8th Grade GPA .012 
(.037) 
.011 
(.036) 
.010 
(.037) 
.011 
(.033) 
.010 
(.033) 
.010 
(.033) 
Male .333*** 
(.050) 
.334*** 
(.050) 
.333*** 
(.050) 
.167*** 
(.045) 
.167*** 
(.045) 
.167*** 
(.045) 
Black -.348*** 
(.070) 
-.344*** 
(.070) 
-.344*** 
(.070) 
-.410*** 
(.061) 
-.404*** 
(.061) 
-.405*** 
(.061) 
Hispanic -.245*** 
(.073) 
-.227*** 
(.074) 
-.225*** 
(.074) 
-.412*** 
(.067) 
-.406*** 
(.068) 
-.404*** 
(.068) 
Urban -.110** 
(.054) 
-.109** 
(.054) 
-.109** 
(-.054) 
-.021 
(.049) 
-.021 
(.049) 
-.021 
(.049) 
Log Household income(10000$) .003 
(.006) 
.003 
(.006) 
.003 
(.006) 
.012** 
(.005) 
.011** 
(.005) 
.011** 
(.005) 
Father Education -.002 
(.006) 
-.002 
(.006) 
-.002 
(.006) 
-.001 
(.005) 
-.001 
(.005) 
-.001 
(.005) 
Mother Education -.002 
(.007) 
-.002 
(.007) 
-.003 
(.007) 
-.009 
(.006) 
-.009 
(.006) 
-.010 
(.006) 
Broken Family -.132 
(.072) 
-.132 
(.071) 
-.134 
(.072) 
.064 
(.063) 
.065 
(.063) 
.063 
(.063) 
Constant -.820 -.784 -.765 -.459 -.449 -.434 
μ1 .656*** 
(.030) 
.656*** 
(.030) 
.656*** 
(.030) 
.570*** 
(.023) 
.570*** 
(.023) 
.570** 
(.023) 
μ2 .998*** 
(.041) 
.998*** 
(.041) 
.999*** 
(.041) 
.829*** 
(.028) 
.830*** 
(.028) 
.830** 
(.028) 
Log-Likelihood -2143.2 -2472.7 -2141.8 -2969.5 -2969.3 -2969.2 
Pseudo R2 .026 .026 .026 .018 .018 .018 
N 3384 3384 3384 3384 3384 3384 
Test of H0: two state laws are not 
jointly significant 
  Chi2 = 3.03 
      p =.220 
  Chi2 = .81 
      p =.666 
Note. Standard errors are in parenthesis.  *** Significant at 1% level, ** Significant at 5% level,* Significant at 10% level. 
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Table 6. Marginal effect of rigor of state child labor law on employment status 
 
0=ijW : 
 
Not working 
1=ijW : 
Working within 
FLSA hours limits 
2=ijW :  
Occasionally 
violating FLSA 
hours limits  
3=ijW :  
Frequently violating 
FLSA hours limits 
At age 14  
(DW = 1) – (DW = 0) .006 -.004 -.001 -.002 
(DS = 1 ) – (DS = 0)  .023 -.013 -.005 -.006 
(DW =1 & DS = 1)-( DW = 0 & DS = 0) .031 -.017 -.006 -.007 
At age 15     
(DW = 1) – (DW = 0) .007 -.003 -.001 -.003 
(DS = 1 ) – (DS = 0)  .013 -.005 -.002 -.006 
(DW =1 & DS = 1)-( DW = 0 & DS = 0) .021 -.008 -.004 -.009 
Note. DW is a dummy variable indicating the state has work permit requirements that exceed federal requirements.   DS is a dummy variable indicating the 
state has compulsory school attendance requirements that exceed federal minimums.  The reported numbers represent the estimated increase in the 
proportion of 14 or 15 year old youth in each employment category going from absence to presence of the respectivestate child labor law. 
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Table 7. Regressions explaining high school completion, college entry and high school GPA as a function of state child 
labor laws and control variables 
Variables High school completion1  College entry1 High school GPA2 
Work Permit Requirement Under age 18 )1( =wD  .013 
(.009) 
.030* 
(.017) 
-.005 
(.019) 
Compulsory schooling attendance above age 16 )1( =sD   .012 
(.009) 
-.003 
(.018) 
.062*** 
(.019) 
8th grade GPA .107*** 
(.007) 
.262*** 
(.013) 
.611*** 
(.013) 
Male -.015* 
(.009) 
-.068*** 
(.017) 
-.115*** 
(.019) 
Black .036*** 
(.009) 
.066*** 
(.022) 
-.116*** 
(.025) 
Hispanic .020* 
(.011) 
-.002 
(.025) 
-.097*** 
(.027) 
Urban -.017* 
(.010) 
.054*** 
(.020) 
-.066*** 
(.021) 
Log Household income ($10000) .014*** 
(.002) 
.028*** 
(.003) 
.011*** 
(.002) 
Father’s education .002** 
(.001) 
.003* 
(.002) 
.006*** 
(.002) 
Mother’s education .006*** 
(.001) 
.017*** 
(.002) 
.005** 
(.002) 
Broken family -.047*** 
(.013) 
-.077*** 
(.024) 
-.016 
(.027) 
Constant   .962*** 
(.058) 
R2   0.442 
Pseudo R2 0.235 0.211  
N 3992 3992 3992 
Test of H0: two state laws are not jointly significant Chi2 = 4.06 
      p =.132 
Chi2 = 3.18 
      p =.204 
F = 5.36 
p =.005 
Note. 1 Marginal effects reported from a probit regression  
          2 OLS regression 
          Standard errors are in parenthesis. *** Significant at 1% level,  ** Significant at 5% level, * Significant at 10% level..  
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Table 8. Regressions explaining high school completion, college entry and high school GPA as a function of employment 
status during the school year and control variables 
Variables High school completion1 College entry
1 High school GPA2 
A. Employment status at age 14    
1=ijW : Working within FLSA hours   
               limits 
.037*** 
(.011) 
.035 
(.027) 
.011 
(.029) 
2=ijW : Occasionally violating FLSA 
               hours limits 
-.058** 
(.031) 
.005 
(.047) 
-.066 
(.052) 
3=ijW : Frequently violating FLSA 
               hours limits 
.007 
(.023) 
.003 
(.048) 
-.024 
(.053) 
    
B. Employment status at age 15    
1=ijW : Working within FLSA hours 
               limits 
.025** 
(.012) 
.032 
(.025) 
.020 
(.027) 
2=ijW : Occasionally violating FLSA  
               hours limits 
-.002 
(.020) 
.074* 
(.039) 
-.026 
(.044) 
3=ijW : Frequently violating FLSA 
               hours limits 
-.013 
(.016) 
-.039 
(.031) 
-.024 
(.033) 
 Note. 1 Marginal effects are reported from a probit regression  
           2 OLS regression. 
             All coefficients are derived from regressions that use the same controls as in Table 7. 
             The reference group includes students who never work at all during the school year 
             Standard errors are in parenthesis. *** Significant at 1% level, ** Significant at 5% level, * Significant at 10% level.  
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Appendix Table 1. Child labor provisions in the Fair Labor Standards Act 
Nonagricultural Jobs 
Age Permissible jobs Hours of work Times of day 
13 or younger Casual free-lance jobs such as 
babysitting and delivering 
newspapers 
NA NA 
14 and 15 Non-manufacturing, non-
mining, non-hazardous jobs1 
Up to 3 hours on a school day 
and 18 hours in a school week; 
up to 8 hours on a non-school 
day and 40 hours in a non 
school week 
Between 7am and 7pm 
except from June 1 through 
Labor Day, when evening 
hours are extended to 9 pm 
16 and 17 Non-hazardous jobs No restrictions No restrictions 
Agricultural Jobs 
Age Permissible jobs Hours of work Times of day 
Under 12 years  Jobs on farms owned or 
operated by parent(s) or non-
hazardous jobs on farms 
Outside of school hours With a parent’s written 
consent or on the same farm 
as the parent(s) 
12 and 13 Non-hazardous jobs Outside of school hours With a parent’s written 
consent or on the same farm 
as the parent(s) 
14 and 15 Non-hazardous jobs Outside of school hours  
16 and older Any jobs Unlimited   
Note. 1 For example, occupations involving transportation, construction, warehousing, or communication, or occupations involving the use of 
            power-driven machinery are regarded as hazardous jobs. 
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Appendix Table 2. Listing of states by age of work permit requirement 
Age required for work 
permit 
States affected Total number 
None Arizona, Florida, Idaho, Kentucky, Montana, Nevada1, Oregon, South Carolina, 
South Dakota, Tennessee, Texas, Utah, Wyoming 
13 
Under age 16 Arkansas, Colorado, Connecticut, Hawaii, Illinois, Iowa, Kansas, Maine, 
Massachusetts, Minnesota, Mississippi, Missouri, Nebraska, New Hampshire, 
New Mexico, North Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma, Rhode Island, Vermont, 
Virginia, West Virginia 
22 
Under age 18 Alabama, Alaska2, California, Delaware, District of Columbia, Georgia, 
Indiana, Louisiana, Maryland, Michigan, New Jersey, New York, North 
Carolina, Pennsylvania, Washington, Wisconsin 
16 
Note. 1.Permit required for working at under age 14. Since this study deals with working at ages 14 and older, the requirement is not effective. 
                2 Permit required under age 17 or under age 19 if the employer is licensed to sell alcohol.  
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Appendix Table 3. Listing of states by legal dropout age  
Age allowed to leave 
school 
States affected Total number 
Age 16 Alabama, Alaska, Arizona, Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware, Florida, Georgia, 
Idaho, Illinois, Iowa, Kansas, Kentucky, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, 
Minnesota, Missouri, Montana, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New York, North 
Carolina, North Dakota, Rhode Island, South Dakota, Vermont, West Virginia, 
Wyoming 
29 
Age 17 Arkansas, Maine, Mississippi, Nevada, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, 
Tennessee 
7 
Age 18 California, District of Columbia, Hawaii, Indiana, Louisiana, Nebraska, New 
Mexico, Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon, Texas, Utah, Virginia, Washington, 
Wisconsin 
15 
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Appendix Table 4. Estimated probability of work status given the presence or absence of various state child labor laws, all 
other factors set at sample means.  Estimates based on the coefficients reported in Table 5  
 
0=ijW : 
 
Not Working 
1=ijW  : 
Working within FLSA 
hours limits  
2=ijW  : 
Occasionally violating 
FLSA hours limits  
3=ijW : 
Frequently violating 
FLSA hours limits 
At age 14     
DW= 0 .816 .124 .031 .029 
DW= 1 .823 .120 .030 .027 
DS= 0 .809 .128 .033 .031 
DS= 1 .832 .115 .028 .025 
DW= 0 & DS= 0 .805 .130 .033 .032 
DW= 1 & DS= 0 .813 .126 .032 .030 
DW= 0 & DS= 1 .829 .117 .029 .026 
DW= 1 & DS= 1 .836 .113 .027 .024 
At age 15     
DW= 0 .710 .159 .047 .084 
DW= 1 .717 .157 .046 .081 
DS= 0 .708 .160 .047 .085 
DS= 1 .720 .155 .045 .079 
DW= 0 & DS= 0 .703 .162 .048 .087 
DW= 1 & DS= 0 .711 .159 .047 .083 
DW= 0 & DS= 1 .717 .157 .046 .081 
DW= 1 & DS= 1 .724 .154 .045 .077 
Note. DW and DS are dummy variables reflecting the rigor of state child labor laws in terms of work permit requirement and compulsory school  
          attendance respectively. 
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Appendix Table 5. Definition of variables and summary statistics (N=3992) 
Variables Definition Mean Std.Dev. Min Max 
Dependent      
HS complete Dummy: one if having completed high school, zero if otherwise 84.7 .359 0 1 
HS GPA Overall marks they received from the 9th to the 12th grade. 
It ranged from 1(below D) to 8(Almost A) and translated into 4.0   
2.86 .783 .5 4 
College entry Dummy: one if having attended college, zero if otherwise .572 .495 0 1 
Work Status14 Employment intensity ordered response representing progressively higher 
values at age 14 
.280 .678 0 3 
Work Status15 Employment intensity ordered response representing progressively higher 
values at age 15 
.508 .935 0 3 
Independent      
Work permit Dummy: one if state required work permit under 18, zero if otherwise .503 .500 0 1 
School leave  Dummy: one if state required students to stay above 16,  
zero if otherwise 
.463 .499 0 1 
8th grades Overall marks they received at 8th grade. 
It ranged from 1(below D) to 8(Almost A) and translated into 4.0 scale 
3.04 .755 .5 4 
Male Dummy: one if male, zero if female .481 .500 0 1 
Black Dummy: one if black, zero if otherwise .246 .431 0 1 
Hispanic Dummy: one if Hispanic, zero if otherwise .190 .392 0 1 
Urban Dummy: one living in urban areas, zero if living in rural areas .715 .452 0 1 
HH income Average household income during the last 5 years (10000dollars) 5.44 4.57 0 32.9 
Father education Biological father or residential father’s highest education level 
It ranged from 1(1st grade) to 20(8th year college) 
13.1 3.26 2 20 
Mother education Biological mother or residential mother’s highest education level 
It ranged from 1(1st grade) to 20(8th year college) 
12.8 2.95 1 20 
Broken family Dummy: if there is at least one missing biological parents, zero if students 
living with both biological parents. 
.439 .496 0 1 
 
 
